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THE REGULATION OF MODERN
BIOMEDICAL TECHNIQUES
Report Submitted by the American National Section, AIDP
Dorean M. Koenig*
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of human biotechnology in the United States suffers from
the lack of a cohesive policy and framework. Regulatory control is frag-
mented, both jurisdictionally and substantively. Additionally, serious social
and ethical dilemmas frustrate the effort to regulate the area. As a result of
this lack of cohesiveness, the controls employed to regulate modern bio-
technology in the United States vary from suggested guidelines recommending
voluntary compliance, to administrative and criminal sanctions for specific
conduct.
This Report will begin by providing an overview of the jurisdictional
interplay between state and federal government as it applies to the regulation
of human biotechnology in the United States. The Report will then apply
this overview, and examine the development of federal and state laws which
regulate genetic therapy, human reproductive technologies, and preembryos
treatment. Each of these three subcategories of human biomedical technology
presents issues and problems not shared by the others. Accordingly, each
will be addressed in a separate section.
I. JURISDICTIONAL OVERVIEW
The structure of federal and state government in the United States allows
for both redundant and inconsistent health and safety laws. Therefore, in
order to evaluate the United States' laws regulating human biomedical
technology, one must first understand the relation between federal and state
law. This section will examine how the power to regulate these matters is
shared between the federal government and the states under our system of
federalism.
The United States Constitution grants limited powers to the national
government and reserves the remainder to the states. The Constitution does
not expressly delegate the regulation of health and safety matters to the
federal government. Consequently, health and safety has been primarily and
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historically a matter of local concern, with regulation being left to the states
or their local subdivisions. Because legislation varies from state to state,
there are potentially fifty different regulations on any given issue.2
Nevertheless, due to the broad interpretation given to some provisions in
the United States Constitution, the federal government has constitutionally
enacted some health and safety regulations, and the potential for far more
federal regulation exists. For example, among the delegated powers, is the
power to regulate interstate commerce.3 Today, almost any action "affects"
interstate commerce, and thus, is within the power of the federal government
to regulate.4 In addition, under Congress' broad spending powers, whenever
the federal government expends federal funds, it may regulate the institution
which receives the funds.' Given these broad general powers of the federal
government, it is clear that Congress can pass laws covering the topics
discussed in this report. Consequently, state laws, federal laws, or both may
regulate the same or similar health and safety matters.6 The practitioner
1. See infra note 6 (discussing federal preemption of health and safety regulations).
2. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, composed of
commissioners from every state in the Union, regularly prepares and advocates the passage of
uniform laws by the several states. For example, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"),
in either its 1968 version, or the updated 1987 version, has been passed with minor amendments
by every state in the Union. 8A U.L.A. 3, 22-23 (Supp. 1989) (listing states which have adopted
the 1968 or the 1987 version). Such uniform adoption helps to regularize state laws. Where
there is no model uniform act, however, or where the model act is not well-received, widespread
differences and confusion may exist throughout the states. E.g., UgnFoRM DMTRKMNATION OF
DEAn ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 310 (Supp. 1983) (definition of death).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8.
4. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding
that Congress overstepped no constitutional limit on its commerce clause power by extending
Fair Labor Standard Act's minimum wage and overtime protections to municipal mass-transit
employees); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (finding congressional power under
commerce clause to regulate single-farm crop productions). For an excellent and timely discussion
of the scope of the modern commerce power, see Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate
Commerce, 41 A.B.A. J. 823, 871-72 (1955).
5. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
6. Notwithstanding this general rule of concurrent regulatory power, there are limits. For
example, under the preemption doctrine, a state or local regulation found to be in conflict with
a federal law will be struck down by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, cl. 2. Even in the absence of such direct conflict, a federal law can
preempt a given area of law if the legislation so provides. Where only federal law is allowed
to prevail, the area is considered preempted; otherwise, there is concurrent federal-state power
to regulate.
In the biomedical area, a preemption issue arose in the Supreme Court decision, Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707 (1985). In Hillsborough, the Food
and Drug Administration had set federal standards for the collection of blood plasma, while a
Florida County had passed further regulation on the same subject. A medical retailer challenged
the local regulations as unconstitutional. The Court held preemption inappropriate, finding a
lack of federal intention to preempt as well as a lack of actual conflict between the local and
federal regulations. Id. at 716-23.
Hillsborough demonstrates that although the preemption doctrine exists as a theoretical
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trying to determine what regulations govern any given area of human bio-
medical technology must check for federal statutes and regulations, as well
as examine state and local law. However, the area is becoming increasingly
federalized. 7
This division of regulatory authority is further complicated by fragmen-
tation in the congressional process. Over 100 committees and subcommittees
of Congress are charged with overseeing science and technology.8 In addition,
a burgeoning federal administrative bureaucracy is being created consisting
of a multitude of agencies, divisions within agencies, boards, offices and
committees, each with its own jealously guarded base of authority. 9 Further,
the areas of control overlap considerably.
International treaties and compacts with other nations, as well as mem-
bership in multinational conventions are also shaping federal policy. The
United States, for example, is a signatory nation and participating member
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).' 0
This is an organization of governments which, among other economic and
social problems, has been reaching agreement as to the regulation of modern
biotechnology. The implementation of agreements reached by the OECD has
been facilitated by executive action at the federal level. The working of
limitation on the potential for biomedical regulatory fragmentation, it will not necessarily be
effective in practice. First, Congress or a federal agency must have taken the initiative by
enacting regulations in a given area in order for the Court to consider applying the doctrine.
Id. at 714. Thus, federal preemption will do nothing to alleviate state-to-state conflicts in
regulations in the absence of some federal law. Second, Hillsborough shows the narrow
interpretation sometimes given to the preemption doctrine even when federal law exists on a
certain topic. The doctrine will apply only where there is clear federal intention to preempt.
Id. at 716-23.
7. See Bonk, FDA Regulation of Biotechnology, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 67 (1988).
8. See N.Y. Times, March 4, 1989, at 14 (etter from Frank H.T. Rhodes, President,
Cornell University, calling on President Bush to appoint an Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology).
9. See, e.g., Genentech's Missteps and FDA Policy Shift Led to TPA Setback, Wall St.
J., June 16, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 6. The article presents a controversy between two FDA
divisions, the Office of Drugs and the newer Office of Biologics. This clash illustrates the
problems of such inter-agency conflict:
But Genentech also was a victim of an FDA policy shift on biotechnology products
and of intra-agency maneuvering for control of them. Staff members in one FDA
division accuse another of wresting away the review of TPA [a clot dissolving drug]
in an effort to win authority over an expected slew of genetically engineered drugs.
A result of the maneuvering was that the FDA changed the criteria Genentech had
been trying to meet during more than two years of clinical testing, gave the company
short notice of new demands, and coached a rival drug company whose competing
clot dissolver was under review for wider use.
Id. See also Editorial and transcript in Wall St. J., July 13, 1987, at 20, col 1-x.
10. The Economist describes the OECD as "the rich countries club." THE EcoNobnsT, 1-7
July, 1989, at 9. In 1985, the United States Department of Commerce estimated that the
worldwide market for genetically altered drugs could reach $100 billion per year by the year
2000. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where
Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1274, 1279 n.28 (1986).
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committees of the OECD prior to decision and recommendation are often
confidential and unpublicized. Whether executive orders can directly imple-
ment such multinational agreements, as well as their binding effect, is unclear
and beyond the scope of this article." These and other jurisdictional conflicts
in the United States must be dealt with and clear lines of authority determined
if chaos is to be avoided in the regulation of modem biomedical techniques.
II. GENETIC PRODUCTS AND INTERFERENCE WITH HuMAN GENES
Advances in genetic engineering provide new systems applicable to a range
of uses-from enhancing agriculture to the conquering of human diseases.
Deoxyribonucleic Acid ("DNA") is the chemical substance which contains
the information that determines the characteristics a human cell will exhibit.'2
DNA is also the essential material in the transmission of genetic information
in other organisms as well. 3 It is now possible to manipulate and combine
various segments of the DNA molecule from different sources." These
"recombinant DNA" molecules can then be introduced into a vector such
as a bacteria or viral-like agent known as plasmid. 5 The vector can then
multiply, replicating the recombinant DNA.' 6 This is commercially done
through large-scale fermentation processes.' 7 The sought after recombinant
DNA product is then retrieved and marketed.' 8 Other processes, including
cell fusion, are also being utilized.' 9 Over the years there has been concern,
11. See infra notes 47-50 (discussing OECD).
12. See generally B. LEwIN, GENES 1 (3d ed. 1987); J. WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF
•tam GENE I (3d ed. 1976).
13. B. LEwIN, supra note 12, ch.2. See generally R. KRUEOE, N. GILnL & J. CoaGn,
JR., INTRODUCTION TO MICROBIOLOGY 1 (1973).
14. B. LEwIN, supra note 12; Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, 233 Scm. AM. 25 (1975);
Crick & Watson, A Structure for Deoxyribonucleic Acid, 171 NATURI! 737 (1953).
15. H. SUTTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO HumA GEnETICS 93 (4th ed. 1988); B. LEwm, supra
note 12, at 350-353 (setting out methods of constructing the chimeric DNA).
16. H. SuTToN, supra note 15, at 93; B. LEwIN, supra note 12, at 350-53.
17. S. OLSON, BIOTECmHOLOOY, AN INDUSTRY ComSs OP AGE 1 (1986).
18. S. OLSON, supra note 17, at 3.
19. Current Developments:
A. Application to individual human beings through correction of single-gene mutations. By
recent count more than two thousand, of the three thousand human genetic disorders trace to
single-gene mutations, that is, a point mutation, a single molecular change in the string of
DNA. Sickle-cell anemia is caused, for example, by a change in the gene that directs synthesis
of the protein molecule that is human hemoglobin. Judson, Designer Genes, The New Republic,
September 19-26, 1983, at 12. Currently, genetic engineers are limited to transferring single
genes, but this is expected to change as technology advances. Schneider, Science Debates Using
Tools to Redesign Life, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
B. To date, six pharmaceuticals produced by genetically engineered bacteria have been
approved by the FDA. Human genes have been inserted into bacteria to produce human insulin
(for diabetes mellitus), human growth hormone (treatment of shortness from pituitary origin),
two alpha-interferons (for treatment of hairy cell leukemia), Hepatitis B vaccine (for Hepatitis
B) and Tissue Plasminogen Activator (TPA) (used for heart attacks). Letter from Frank E.
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now sometimes considered overreactive, that molecules placed in living cells
may be hazardous. For example, if DNA is placed in a bacteria it is possible
that the bacteria will be disseminated into the environment and cause harmful
or unpredictable results to plants, animals, and humans. This is especially
feared where recombinant DNA includes a harmful gene used in experimen-
tation.
Young, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to NIH (51 Fed. Reg. 45,650-02, Dec 19, 1986)
(discussion of containment issues). See also Pollack, Gene-Splicing Payoff is Near, N.Y. Times,
June 10, 1987, at 29. Another major product, Interleukin-2, promising as a treatment for
cancer, is expected to be approved by 1989. Pollack, supra, at 48 (there is also erythropotietin,
or EPO, that helps in producing red blood cells, with hopes of treatment for anemia in patients
undergoing kidney dialysis; colony-stimulating factors for treatment of cancer; a trial natriuretic
factor, a potential treatment for hypertension; an epidermal growth factor for treating burn
victims; and, superoxide dismutase, which helps prevent damage caused by the resumption of
blood flow to an organ after a heart attack, etc.).
C. Applications for vaccines. Scientists, have transplanted foreign genes into the bacteria that
make up the tuberculosis vaccine, an important preliminary step in adapting that vaccine for
use against other diseases. Schmeck, Genes Transplanted Into Vaccine for Tuberculosis, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1987, at 13-18. Similarly, a prototype vaccine against salmonella, produced
through genetic engineering, is being carried out in mouse experiments. The Detroit Free Press,
June 27, 1989 at 2.
D. Chimera, half-mouse, half-human cells, for use as hybrid monoclonal antibodies to
fight cancer have been developed through a process of cell fusion and are in experimental
use. See S. OLSoN, supra note 17, at 25-29; Schmeck, Antibodies Redesigned as Potent New
Tools, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1987, at 13-18. These cells are produced by a technique which
brings together genetic material from two cells to produce a hybrid that can be reproduced
through cloning. G. FIEnMEDAL, MAGIC BULLETS 58-61 (1984). The chimeric antibodies solve
two problems. It has been relatively easy to produce mouse monoclonal antibodies against a
great many substances, but much more difficult to do this with human monoclonals. Using
antibodies from mice in treating humans often leads to a damaging immune reaction because
the antibody is foreign. By combining the target-seeking part of the mouse antibody with
the other antibody part from a human, the risk of immune reaction may be much reduced.
Id.
E. Diagnostic Tests. Predictive testing for Huntington's Chorea, a dominantly inherited,
untreatable, progressive, and eventually lethal disease, is now possible through the finding of
a genetically linked DNA marker. BioLAw RPT. U:139. A technique developed through
recombinant DNA research permits prenatal diagnosis of hereditary diseases such as phenyl-
ketonuria, Lesch-Nyhan disease and Thalassemia, and may soon be able to do so simply by
taking a blood sample from the mother, since some fetal blood cells cross the placenta. See
Gulley & Bird, Regulation of Biomedical Applications of Recombinant DNA Research, 19 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1984); Francis, Recent Developments in Genetic Diagnosis: Some Ethical
and Legal Implications, 1986 UTri L. REv. 483-493 (1986). Medical researchers have also
identified the genes that cause Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, retinal cancer, and osteosarcoma.
BioLAw RpR. U:140.
F. Transgenic animals are currently being produced at the Department of Agriculture research
center in Beltsville, Md. Schneider, supra, at 10. For example, pigs are being produced by
injecting genes into fertilized animal eggs. Piercing cell walls kills between half and three
quarters of the eggs. Thus, researchers are currently manipulating the primordial cells that
produce sperm and eggs to enable breeders to select the characteristics of animals, including
gender. See THE TRANSOEmC A &AL REoULATORY REFORM ACT, H.R. 4971, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) (which failed to become law).
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On the other hand, use and development of these new techniques is
resolving many severe health problems and may revolutionize agriculture.
Applications of this aspect ,of genetic engineering include large scale pro-
duction of products such as human insulin. 20 The prospect of human gene
therapy2' is another potential benefit of recombinant DNA techniques. How-
ever, direct applications to humans, heretofore have been limited."
This section of the Report will examine current regulation of genetic
engineering, as well as concerns about the future course of genetic engi-
neering. As federal regulation in this area is the most comprehensive to date,
it will receive special attention.
A. Federal Regulation
Over the years, a number of federal statutes have been enacted which,
while not designed specifically for this purpose, do regulate the products of
recombinant DNA and modern biomedical techniques.23 Also, Congress has
established a Biomedical Ethics Board to report annually to Congress, but
it has not functioned well.Y There are over 100 committees and subcom-
mittees of the Congress dedicated to science and technology." It is clear that
Congress has not regulated recombinant DNA or modern biomedical tech-
nology as a distinct field, but instead has left its regulation to laws which
20. See supra note 19, part B.
21. Goene therapy is the introduction of genes into a patient with a harmful genetic trait in
order to effect a cure, without passing the cure onto offspring (somatic), or to affect future
generations (germline). S. OasoN, supra note 17, at 7.
22. See discussion infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text; S. OtsoN, supra note 17, at
43-53.
23. A matrix of laws that may be applicable to biotechnology products "at some point in
research, development, marketing, shipment, use or disposal" has been assembled at 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,174, beginning at 47,177 (Nov. 14, 1985). Statutes include: the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301-392; the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262; the Virus-Serum-
Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. § 151-158; Toxic Substances Control Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2601-2929; the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y; the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651-678; the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657; the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6987; Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (Ocean Dumping), 33 U.S.C. § 1404-1445; Federal Meat In-
spection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 451-470; the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §
1801-1812; the Federal Plant Pest Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-jj; Animal Quarantine
Laws (cites omitted); the Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 2801-2813; the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642; the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376; the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300f-300j-26; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4361; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536; and others.
24. The Board has led a precarious life and has yet to produce a single report. Its current
charge is to report on nutrition and hydration for the dying. See discussion infra in Section
III, Reproduction Technology, on its earlier charge to report fetal research. Cf. Capron,
Bioethics on the Congressional Agenda, 1989 HASnNs CENTER RIlOaT 22 (March/April).
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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govern both ordinary technology as well as the new technologies.26
The existing system of oversight of these modern technologies has thus
been left to the executive agencies and the President.2 7 However, the executive
machinery for regulating modern biomedical technology suffers from both
inter and intra-agency rivalries, gaps in jurisdiction, and other inadequacies
of oversight. This should be expected from agencies not designed to regulate
this business, carrying out laws also not designed for that purpose, Two
issues have been at the forefront: safety concerns related to containment;
and moral, safety and ethical concerns over use of recombinant DNA in
treating individuals.2 9 Each will be considered in turn.
1. Asilomar and the RAC
The first reaction to the possible dangers of recombinant DNA research
was panic over safety concerns,30 resulting in the International Conference
on Recombinant DNA Molecules in 1975. 31 The first federal guidelines soon
followed in 1976.32 These early regulations called for strict containment
procedures and completely prohibited certain experiments. 33 These guidelines
set the jurisdiction for regulation within the National Institute of Health
(NIH).14 A Recombinant Advisory Board (the RAC) was established to advise
the NIH. 5
26. See Barkstrom, Recombinant DNA and the Regulation of Biotechnology: Reflections
on the Asilomar Conference, Ten Years After, 19 AKRON L. REv. 81, 93 (1985).
27. Gore & Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y Rav. 336, 340
(1985).
28. "The central problems of the regulatory framework include its scattered authority, which
has resulted in a 'balkanized' regime of biotechnology oversight, and the limited expertise of
the agencies involved." Gore & Owens, supra note 27, at 343.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 102-114.
30. In 1971, attempts were made to join an animal tumor virus with a human virus and
insert them into an E Coli bacteria. E Coli naturally lives in everyone's gut. Publicity about
these experiments caused much public concern. See Areen, Regulating Human Gene Therapy,
88 W. VA. L. REv. 153, 155 (1985).
31. The initial anxiety was that genetic manipulation of E Coli could result in the creation
of pathogenic bacterial strains that might cause mass epidemics or the spread of cancer. See
Motulsky, Impact of Genetic Manipulation on Society and Medicine, 219 Scl. 135, 136 (Jan.
14. 1983) (citing D. JACKSON & S. Sncl, TmE PEcOMMINANT DNA DEBATE (1979); J. WATSON
& J. ToozE, TE DNA STORY, A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF GENE CLoNntO (1981)).
32. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). The recommendations of the Asilomar Conference were
adopted by the NIH until the new Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) guidelines
were developed. Gore & Owens, supra note 27, at 337.
33. For an extensive history of containment procedure regulations, see Barkstrom, supra
note 26; 43 Years of Advances in Altered Life Forms, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, § 1, at 17,
col. 1.
34. See Gore & Owens, supra note 27, at 337.
35. Originally, the RAC was composed of 12 scientists in the fields of molecular biology,
virology, genetics, and microbiology. It was enlarged in 1978 to include nonscientists. Jaffe,
Inadequacies in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 11 Hmtv. E~mrr1. L. REv. 491, 496
(1987); Areen, supra note 30, at 157.
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Setting regulation within the NIH appears in retrospect an odd choice,
36
since the regulations applied only to projects funded by the NIH or directly
undertaken by the NIH. 37 The only penalty for violating the guidelines was
withdrawal of the grant money.38 However, many private companies working
with recombinant DNA adopted the guidelines, and even submitted research
proposals to the RAC.39 Other governmental agencies followed suit, as well
as state and local governments. 40 The guidelines established the RAC of the
NIH "as the primary point of regulatory oversight in the federal govern-
ment."
4
'
The strict containment guidelines were modified in 1978 to allow the
forbidden, categories to be excepted from the prohibitions with the express
approval of the Director of NIH, and the advice of the RAC.42 However,
the containment requirements were retained,'4 so that the RAC and the NIH
typically conduct case-by-case determinations.
A number of problems developed to threaten the expansion of RAC
jurisdiction. First, other agencies, such as the EPA, were beginning to
challenge the RAC's expansive scope of responsibility over the release of
genetically-modified organisms." Second, the limited jurisdiction of the RAC
and its lack of environmental experts caused criticism. 4 Finally, many ex-
periments and, thus their related problems were now passing from the
laboratory into the manufacturing realm. With this shift came the court's
approval of the patenting of new life forms.46
36. But probably apt, since the modem technologies were at that time primarily at the
research stage, and were frequently federally funded.
37. Gore & Owens, supra note 27, at 337.
38. S. OLsoN, supra note 17, at 69.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Areen, supra note 30.
41. Areen, supra note 30, at 157.
42. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,108 § I-D-6 (1978).
43. 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958, NIH Guidelines, May 7, 1986.
44. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880-01. Notice of proposed policy. EPA plans to address certain
microbial products of biotechnology under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substance Containment Act (TSCA) (Dec. 31, 1984). The proposed
policy states: "Inconsistent or duplicative domestic regulation will put U.S. producers at a
competitive disadvantage."
45. On June 1, 1983, the NIH authorized release of a genetically engineered frost-inhibiting
bacteria into a potato field. A group of environmentalists, led by Jeremy Rifkin, won an
injunction in federal court against the release, with Judge Sirica stating: "[Tlhe Court must
conclude that the 'standard' for granting a waiver can only be described as whatever it takes
to win the confidence of, hopefully, at least a majority of the RAC and the subsequent approval
of the Director of NIH." Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753, 760
(D.D.C. 1984). Although there is a "Risk Assessment Subcommittee" to advise the RAC, it
appears that the NIH "may not be totally prepared to evaluate potential hazards." Barkstrom,
supra note 26, at 105. See also, affirmation by the appeals court in Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1985) where the Court stated: "RAC completely
failed to consider the possible environmental impact from dispersion of genetically altered
bacteria, however small the number and however subject to procedures limiting survival." Id.
46. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
MODERN BIOMEDICAL TECHNIQUES
2. The OECD & the Development of a New Regulatory Framework
In July, 1983, the OECD's Committee for Scientific and Technological
Policy appointed an ad hoc group of government experts to study recom-
binant DNA safety considerations.47 The restricted recommendations of the
ad hoc group were made public on May 30, 1986, and adopted by the OECD
Council on July 16, 1986.48
The group's major recommendation was to limit regulation of the vast
majority of industrial recombinant DNA large-scale applications to minimal
containment. This could be achieved simply by following good industrial
large-scale practice (GILSP).4 9 The group also recognized that the technology
of physical containment was well-known to industry and that recombinant
DNA micro-organisms of higher risk could now be handled safely. 0 Finally,
the group recommended that less developed agricultural and environmental
applications of recombinant DNA could be approached by analogy to tra-
ditionally modified organisms." The major thrust of the recommendations
was that there was no need for specific legislation for recombinant DNA
products. 2 The report stated: "Member countries should examine their
existing oversight and review mechanisms to ensure that adequate review and
control may be applied while avoiding any undue burdens that may hamper
technological developments in this field." '5 3
During the same time that the OECD group was meeting to simplify and
reduce the regulation of recombinant DNA products and other products of
biotechnology, plans were being made in the United States to restructure
existing laws and agencies into a comprehensive federal regulatory policy.
This restructuring had the effect of decentralizing the role of the RAC of
the NIH and diminishing the impact of its intensive regulation. In December,
1984, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the
President (OSTP), proposed a coordinated framework for the regulation of
biotechnology. 4 The new regulatory body would have been housed within
47. Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations, Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development, OECD 3 (1986) [hereinafter OECD-Safety]. There were 17 participants
from the United States, including representatives from the EPA, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the NIH, the Department of Agriculture, and the FDA, Id. at 64-65. No
other country had more than five participants, except Japan, which had 13. There were seven
participants from the Commission of the European Communities. Dr. R. Nourish from the
United Kingdom was Chairman. Id. at 57-65.
48. The Council recommendations are made by mutual agreement between the member
nations. OECD-Safety, supra note 47, at 3.
49. OECD-Safety, supra note 47, at 41.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (§ I (2)).
54. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Notice of Proposed Coordinated Framework
for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Rep. 50,856 (Dec. 31, 1984) [hereinafter The Dec.
84 Notice].
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the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the regulatory
scheme would have required a two-tiered review of procedures and products.
The idea of agency review, however, was rejected in favor of "an inter-
agency coordinating committee composed of senior representatives from the
involved agencies including NIH, NSF, Agriculture, EPA and FDA." This
was viewed as providing "federal agency officials from different agencies a
forum for discussing scientific questions raised in regulatory and research
applications. '" ' This change meant that public participation in an open
review mechanism was being compromised in favor of a closed forum. This
new coordinating committee, called the Biotechnology Science Coordinating
Committee ("BSCC") was set up under the Federal Coordinating Council
for Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET), rather than within the
DHHS. The FCCSET falls within the ambit of the OSTP, which is within
the Executive Office of the President.56
Policy matters relating to agency jurisdiction, commercialization, and
international biotechnology matters, which would include the OECD, were
set up separately within a new Domestic Policy Council Working Group on
Biotechnology. This working group, however, was at that time chaired by
the Director of the OSTP, using the staff support of the OSTP.57 The
National Science Foundation's (NSF) Assistant Director for Biological, Be-
havioral and Social Sciences also assisted the director of the OSTP.' This
coordination was done by the working group.59
One immediate effect of the restructuring was a need to define the juris-
diction of competing agencies. Specific agencies were designated as respon-
sible for a particular experiment, and, where there were multiple agencies
with potential jurisdiction, one agency was designated as the lead agency. 0
Even with that modification, the RAC and NIH still maintained a notification
and review function. However, on August 24, 1987, the NIH made two
modifications to the NIH Guidelines, in which they relinquished review
functions. Noting that large-scale fermentation was producing more than 2
billion dollars annually, the guidelines were modified EO indicate that large-
scale fermentation experiments, under all but the first containment level,
needed no greater containment than that for the host organism.6' In other
words, the products of recombinant DNA were not to be treated differently
than other products. The NIH also. modified its guidelines so that an
55. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology; Establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed.
Reg, 47,174 (1985) [hereinafter Framework].
56. 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,176. For an excellent diagram see Jaffe, supra note 35, at
Figure 3.
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,175 (Nov. 14, 1985).
58. Id.
59. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26, 1986).
60. Id. at 23,305.
61. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,848-02 (Aug. 24, 1987). However, the institutional biosafety committee,
a local entity, can specify higher containment if it deems it necessary.
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application may be sent to any other federal agency that has jurisdiction for
review and approval, and that once approved all applicants could proceed
without NIH review or approval. 62
The process of diffusion has now become almost complete. The other
agencies in the BSCC have developed their own policies for governing
recombinant DNA technology. These regulations, for the most part, are
grounded in the premise that recombinant DNA technology is not to be
treated as a distinct field, but rather, is more appropriately regulated by the
agencies' pre-existing general policies. For example, it has been suggested
that the federal legislative history of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
"shows a clear intent by Congress not to regulate recombinant DNA research
as a distinct technology.' '63 This is the current policy.
For example, the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency
within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), approves new
human drugs, biologics, food additives, medical devices and cosmetics. 4 In
addition, the FDA regulates both federally funded and nonfederally funded
products, including those produced by genetic engineering. 61 Consistent with
the nonspeciality philosophy outlined above, the FDA has proposed no new
procedures or requirements for the products of genetic engineering. Instead,
the agency has reviewed on a case-by-case basis the intended use of each
product, under its ordinary procedures. 66
62. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,848-02. However, the notice retained jurisdiction over gene therapy to
human subjects.
63. Barkstrom, supra note 26, at 93.
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1988) (food additives); id. § 355 (new drugs).
65. FDA regulations prohibit shipment of any drug in interstate commerce until it establishes
that the drug is safe and effective. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988).
66. Under FDA regulations, clinical investigations of human subjects that demonstrate a
new drug is safe and effective, must be made by a qualified expert. Sponsors file a Notice of
Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug ("IND") to conduct clinical investigations
on human subjects, including, for example, drug composition, manufacturing and control data,
results of animal testing, training and experience of investigators, and a plan for clinical
investigation. In addition, informed consent and protection of the rights and safety of human
subjects is required. FDA, Final Policy Statement for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 51
Fed. Reg. 23,309, 23,310 (1986) [hereinafter Final Policy Statement]. The FDA evaluates IND
submissions and reviews ongoing clinical investigations.
FDA approval of a New Drug Application or an abbreviated New Drug Application is
required before a new drug can be marketed. This application must contain information about
the composition of the drug, manufacturing and packaging procedures and controls, any clinical
and nonclinical studies, and any pharmacological and toxicological effects.
Outside of human experimentation, the final policy statement of the FDA, in noting the
adequacy of current standards, has concluded that differences in the structure of molecules
through recombinant DNA might affect the immunogenicity of a drug. Immunogenicity is "the
property that endows a substance with the capacity to provoke an immune response, or the
degree to which a substance possesses that property." Do..ANr's ILLUSTRATED MEDWAL Dxc-
TIONARY (27th ed. 1988) [hereinafter DoRLAmD's]. Thus for the FDA, this characteristic will
affect the extent to which regulations and testing are deemed necessary.
The use of recombinant DNA technology to manufacture new drugs or biological
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A second meeting of the OECD biotechnology committee was held in
April, 1988, in Paris and chaired by NIH Director, Dr. James B. Wyngaar-
den. In this meeting it was recommended that a working group be formed
to develop criteria for field testing of plants and microorganisms which fall
into a low or minimal risk category.67 One of the highest priorities set by
the committee was the drafting of recommended standards and creating these
standards will be the group's primary focus in the upcoming year. The
working group on field testing will be working with restricted documents
not available to the public.
The U.S. delegation to this working group, while appointed by the State
Department, will be representing the OECD alone. 8 This raises two concerns.
First, the lack of public input, and second, the imposition of secretly
determined recommendations, no matter how laudable, from this organiza-
tion of governments upon agencies of the United States federal government.
The danger of this lack of public input is magnified when, as here, agreements
are being made between member countries upon recommendations of experts
who are high in the administration of these same agencies. There have been
assurances that criteria agreed to by the member nations will not supersede
this country's laws. However, the processes by which the first OECD recom-
mendations were adopted are disquieting. 69
products may result in products that differ from similar products manufactured
with conventional methods.... In some instances the molecular structure of the
product may differ from the structure of the active molecule in nature. For example,
the first human growth homone manufactured using recombinant microorganisms
has an extra amino acid ... hence, it is an analogue of the native homone. Such
differences could affect the drug's activity or immunogenicity and, consequently,
could affect the extent of testing required.
Final Policy Statement, supra, at 23,311.
The FDA policy also mandates quality control in the manufacture of new drugs or biological
products produced by recombinant techniques. Manufacturers of new drugs and biologics must
always operate in conformance with current good manufacturing practice regulations. Id. at
23,310. As with conventionally produced products, assurance of adequate processing techniques
and controls is important in the manufacturing of any genetically-produced new drug or
biological product. For example, the occurrence of mutations in the coding sequence of a cloned
gene during fermentation could give rise to a subpopulation of molecules with an anomalous
primary structure and alterred activity. This is a potential problem inherent in the production
of polypeptide in any fermentation process. The FDA has, therefore, prepared a series of
"Points to Consider" for monoclonal antibodies, recombinant DNA technology, and the use
of new cell substrate. However, the focus of the FDA is on the end product and good
manufacturing processes, rather than on experimentation. Thus, "unless there is some factual
basis for charging that recombinant DNA produces a deleterious substance, or that recombinant
DNA manufacturing is not in conformance with good manufacturing practices, the FDA lacks
a strong basis for regulation." Barkstrom, supra note 26, at 93.
67. Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee Meeting Summary 3 [hereinafter BSCC
report] (submitted to NIH by Walcoff & Associates, Inc. (703) 684-5588) (July 29, 1989).
68. BSCC report, supra note 67, at 8.
69. Such procedures are continuing right now with the field testing questions. It remains to
be seen whether the EPA's authority under FIFRA and TSCA to regulate or prohibit the field
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The early guidelines overestimated the potential hazards of recombinant
DNA. What was applauded at the time as the exemplary behavior of the
scientists in bringing to public attention the possible hazards of recombinant
DNA, became in a few years the awkward realization that these restrictions
were causing unnecessary impediments to the development of a multibillion
dollar industry.70 The current trend is to ease these restrictions.
3. Human Gene Therapy
After a seven month delay, the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee of
the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee of the NIH (RAC) approved
the performance of procedures which constituted a prelude to human gene
therapy. This procedure was subsequently approved by the RAC and Dr.
James B. Wyngaarden, Director of NIH in early 1989. Researchers are to
be allowed to insert a marker gene into human tumor infiltrating lymphocytes
(TILs), which will allow doctors to trace the TILs through patients receiving
the treatment. 7'
The Working Group Subcommittee on Human Gene Therapy was created
to advise the RAC and the NIH on guidelines for research on human
applications of gene therapy.7 2 The group is composed of four physicians,
two microbiologists, three lawyers, three ethicists, two public policy experts,
and one lay member, appointed without public consultation. 3 The NIH and
its committees lack significant public participation in both the development
of policy and regulation. 74
testing of the products of biotechnology is eroded by any recommendations of the OECD. This
is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of EPA jurisdiction, see Jaffe, supra note
35, at 510-17, 538-42.
70. "If one understands biology, the fundamental aspects of recombinant DNA experiments
are not at all bothersome." Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist's View, 3 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 315, 325 (1985). This view is shared by Daniel Callahan, Director of the Hastings
Center, a non-profit institute exploring the social implications of modem biomedical techniques:
"It's very hard to sustain a great deal of worry about these things when, after ten years of
pretty constant interest and attention, there have been no untoward events." Concern Over
Genetics Prompts a New Coalition of Critics, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 3
[hereinafter Critics].
71. BioLAw REP. U:1279-80 (Minutes of the RAC are available from the Office of Recom-
binant DNA Activities, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services).
72. See OFmcE OF TECHNOLOGY Ass s MNT, HUMAN GENE TERnAPy: BACKGROUND PAPER
1 (1984).
73. Areen, supra note 30, at 153. The Working Group has passed this change in the
definition of reconbinant DNA: "In the context of these guidelines, recombinant DNA molecules
are defined as either (i) molecules which are constructed outside living cells by joining foreign
natural or foreign synthetic DNA segments to DNA molecules that can replicate in a living
cell, or (ii) DNA molecules that result from the replication of those described in (i) above."
51 Fed. Reg. 46,650-02 (Dec. 19, 1986). A footnote to "foreign" would state: "Rearrangements
involving the introduction of DNA from different organisms or different strains of an organism
will be considered recombinant DNA." See BIoLAw REP. U:235-236.
74. "[Ulnfortunately, the members of the Working Group were chosen without public
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There has been some criticism that the RAC is both promoting the new
technology, and regulating it, and that these aims are conflicting. Similarly,
the Working Group on Human Gene Therapy has been criticized on the one
hand for not having enough scientists, and on the other hand for having
too many scientists.5
RAC regulation of human genetic engineering falls into two categories:
first, the containment and approval requirements for research; second, the
regulations specifically aimed at human gene therapy. Further, human gene
therapy must also take into account germ line intervention.7 6 These three
categories will be discussed in turn.
a. Containment and approval
Four biosafety levels were established in the 1986 RAC Guidelines, and
experiments involving human subjects were set at the II1-A level. The III-A
level requires that the local Institutional Review Board (IRB) review a
proposal prior to submission to the RACY.7  The review board is convened
at the sponsoring institution. Any such proposal must then be published in
the Federal Register for thirty days of comment. 78 Next, it is reviewed by
the RAC and must have the specific approval of the NIH.7 9 The III-A
experiments also require the approval of a local Institutional Biosafety
Committee (IBC).80 This committee is also convened at the sponsoring
institution. An IBC must have at least five members that have experience in
recombinant DNA technology and have the ability to assess the safety and
risks of experimentation with recombinant DNA. Additionally, an IBC must
include two community members.
consultation. Consequently, the RAC and the Working Group should proceed only after
consulting as widely as possible with interested experts and lay groups alike." Areen, supra
note 30, at 166.
Currently, there is little consideration for public participation in the regulation
hearings. The NIH has adopted the notice and comment requirements for rule-
making found in the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). This allows the public to
'participate' only to the extent that written comments may be submitted to the
NIH. The NIH is not obligated to pay heed to such comments. Therefore, public
involvement is minimal.
Spaeth, Genetic Engineering Research: An Analysis of the Government's Role in Regulation,
7 UTv. oF BRIDOEPORT L. REv. 71, 91 n.117 (1986).
75. See Areen, supra note 30, at 168 n.81.
76. For a more detailed discussion on germ line research, see infra notes 93-99 and
accompanying text.
77. See Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 51 Fed. Reg.
16,958, 16,960 (1986) (hereinafter DNA Research).
78. Id. at 16,960.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The responsibility of the sponsoring institution and each individual scientist
is set out in the Guidelines." Once adopted, the sponsoring institution is
required to report any significant problems to the NIH Office of Recombi-
nant DNA Activities.sz This system, therefore, relies on the individual re-
searcher to follow the guidelines; there are no mechanisms to monitor the
researcher's laboratory work.
b. Human gene therapy
On September 29, 1986, the RAC adopted Human Somatic-Cell Gene
Therapy Protocols including "Points to Consider." 3 Similar but updated
"Points to Consider" are currently in the comment period." The Protocols
are guidelines which are adhered to when human genetic material is manip-
ulated in order to diagnose and treat human disorders involving genetic
defects.
Experiments in which recombinant DNA is introduced into cells of a
human subject with the intent of stabilizing and modifying the subject's
genome, 85 are required to be reviewed by the RAC and approved by the
NIH prior to the experiments being carried out. The RAC will consider each
proposal on a case-by-case basis. The RAC must (1) publish a precise
proposal in the Federal Register, (2) allow an opportunity for public com-
ment, and (3) review the proposal through a working group. RAC recom-
mendations on each proposal are forwarded to the NIH Director for a
decision which will then be published in the Federal Register. The NIH
Director may approve proposals only if he finds that they present "[n]o
significant risk to health or the environment." ' 6 In addition, a proposal will
be considered by the RAC only after it has been approved by the local
Institutional Biosafety Committee and by the local Institutional Review
Board, in accordance with Department of Health and Human Services
Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects. 7 Moreover, if a proposal
involves children, special attention is necessary. 8
81. Id. at 16,962. Other experiments using human pathogens as host-vector systems or
cloning DNA from human pathogens in non-pathogenic prokaryotic or lower eukaryotic host-
vector systems are set at a lower III-B level which requires approval only from the local IBC.
Id.
82. Id.
83. 54 Fed. Reg. 10,956-02 (Jan. 1989). On January 30, 1989 the RAC appointed a "Points
to Consider" subcommittee to review and update the "Points to Consider." NIH Points to
Consider in the Design and Submission of Human Somatic-Cell Gene Therapy Protocols (Sept.
29, 1986).
84. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,660-02 (1986).
85. Genome is defined as "the complete gene compliment of an organism, contained in a
set of chromosomes in eukaryotes, a single chromosome in bacteria, or a DNA or RNA molecule
in viruses." DORIAND'S, supra note 66, at 687.
86. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,660-02 (June 23, 1989).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The standards to be applied are provided by the "Points to Consider" in
the Design and Submission of Human Somatic-Cell Gene Therapy Protocols.
This document provides, in pertinent part: "[in general, it is expected that
somatic-cell gene therapy protocols will not present a risk to the environment
as the recombinant DNA is expected to be confined to the human subject."'3
This issue, however, has yet to be addressed.2 Two aspects of the clinical
application of human gene therapy are considered in the document: the
application of gene therapy to humans, and the social and ethical issues
involved with human gene therapy.
The RAC has stated that it will consider somatic-cell therapy protocols in
its approval process. The RAC requires that the design "offers adequate
assurance that their consequences will not go beyond their purpose ...
namely, to benefit the health and well-being of the individual being treated
while at the same time gathering generalizable knowledge." 9' Finally, the
Protocols require an examination of information from researchers on the
unintentional vertical transmission to offspring, or horizontal transmission
of viral infection to other persons with whom the individual comes in
contact.92 Additionally, the Protocols require accurate information be made
available to the public.
C. Germ line
The RAC does not at this time consider human germ line research.93
However, the RAC Protocols do consider the possible long-term effects of
applying knowledge gained in correcting gene defects in somatic cells to
applications involving germ line intervention.9 4 Nevertheless, the position of
the "Points to Consider" is that germ line intervention will not follow
immediately or inevitably from experiments with somatic-cell gene therapy."
Finally, the Protocols require applicants to disclose whether they intend
to patent or to trademark their experiments.9 It is important to note here
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,660-02 (June 23, 1989)
92. Id.
93. The Committee for Responsible Genetics of Boston, Mass., submitted a proposal which
would have forbidden either review or approval of human genetic therapy or any such therapy
that was not aimed solely at the refief of a life-threatening or severely disabling condition. In
addition, the proposal asked for a similar prohibition on any in vitro recombinant DNA
experiments that alter human germ line cells or early human embryos. Final Policy Statement,
supra note 66, at 23,310. This proposal was rejected on the grounds that the RAC would not
at present entertain proposals for germ-line alterations, and that an outright ban would harm
research efforts in human reproductive biology.
94. Germ line intervention is manipulation of genetic material of an egg or sperm. Because
manipulation is done at this early stage, the genetic change will be carried in all cells of the
organism which is produced from those gametes. M.A. SANros, GENErics AND MAN'S FuTuRa
65-66 (1981).
95. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,660-02 (June 23, 1989).
96. Id.
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that the United States Patent and Trademark Office decided in April, 1987,
to allow inventors to patent animals produced by new biological technologies.
The effect of this decision will be to accelerate the development of transgenic
animals, which will almost certainly affect human gene research and devel-
opment. 97 The OECD has been exploring the safety aspects of recombinant
DNA productions in this realm, especially industrial mass production.
However, the OECD does not intend to become embroiled in the ethical
problems of recombinant DNA research involving human subjects."
B. State Regulation
While the RAC guidelines apply to federally funded research, this does
not prevent the states from regulating recombinant DNA genetic engineering.
Thus, should someone be killed as a result of a catastrophe caused by the
wrongful application of recombinant DNA, charges could be brought under
the state laws of murder or manslaughter.
Some cities have adopted legislation which specifically regulates human
gene therapy. Boston, for example, has enacted legislation adopting the NIH
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules.'1 This
legislation also establishes a Boston Biohazard Committee and imposes a
penalty in the form of a fine of $200.00 per day for violations. Similar
ordinances have been passed elsewhere.10'
C. Emerging Social Problems
Approximately one out of every twenty babies is born with a discernible
genetic deficiency, between twenty and twenty-five percent of all chronic
97. Hearings held on June 11, 1987, by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice, to assess this decision produced sharp clashes and
reflect the intensifying debate over effects animal patents might have on the development of
the biotechnology industry, particularly commercialization of the science and the patenting of
human traits. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1987, § 1, at 12, col. 3. As of June 9, 1987, legislation
had passed the Senate which would impose a moratorium on the patenting of animals until
October 1, so that Congress would have time to consider the issues. This development followed
naturally from the decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) in which the
Court allowed genetically engineered bacteria to be patented.
An emerging problem related to the commercialization of gene research lies in the relationship
between educational institutions, traditionally at the forefront of new technologies, and industry,
with its problems of corporate control. There are currently a multiplicity of connections between
universities and industry in the biotechnical field. See M. KENNEY, Blo-mcmoLoGy: THE
UNIVrRsITY-INDuSTRIAL COMPLEX (1986); Motulsky, supra note 31, at 137.
98. See supra note 70.
99. Conversation with Dr. Solomon Wald, OECD's Science and Technology Policies, in
Paris (July 8, 1988).
100. BOSTON, MASS., OPnLnD.es ch. 9 (1986); BOSTON, MASS. OsRDmAcES ch. 12 (1981).
101. Ordinances have been adopted in Berkley, Cal., Emeryville, Cal., Amherst, Mass.,
Cambridge, Mass., Newton, Mass., Somerville, Mass., and Princeton, N.J. The State of New
York has also passed a statute regulating recombinant DNA experiments. 44 N.Y. Pun. HEALTH
LAW §§ 3221-3223 (McKinney 1985). See Spaeth, supra note 74, at 71 n.54.
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diseases are of genetic origin, and at least half of the hospital beds in
America are occupied by patients with problems of a genetic origin.' o2 There
are, in fact, 3,000 such genetic diseases. 0 3
With the rapid advances in germ line research on animals, it is only a
matter of time until the results are used in experiments involving the human
germ line. This will almost certainly occur first in the area of negative
alteration of the human germ line; that is, altering the human germ line to
eliminate diseases inherited through single cell deficiencies.
Scientists and moralists are split as to whether or not to allow treatments
to correct genetic disorders through manipulation of the human germ line.
Such manipulation would occur by altering the egg or sperm cells passing
the genetic material on to future generations. The main concern appears to
be that if the line is not drawn at preventing germ line alteration, no other
line will be able to be drawn. The potential result could be inadvertent
changes vhich affect what it means to be human.
However, medicine already acts so as to allow negative engineering of the
human germ line. Current medical treatments have kept alive persons with
gene defects who would have previously died and these persons have had
children who carry the defective gene.'0 Moreover, it is doubtful whether
alteration of the human germ line can be stopped, given the research currently
being conducted on animals. Finally, there is a serious question as to whether
pure research in this area should be stopped, 05 or whether under the con-
stitutional framework it can be stopped.106
Assuming alteration of the human germ line begins by way of correcting
life-threatening genetic conditions, the next question involves the correction
of non-life threatening conditions. The gamut of possibilities ranges from
changing the gene responsible for asthma or human baldness to altering
genes for beauty, intelligence, memory or stamina. Indeed, "the line between
positive and negative genetic engineering is perhaps too elusive for the law
to pin down for regulation."' 107
A primary area of concern is diagnostic testing of fetuses through recom-
binant DNA. Such prenatal testing can be done during the first trimester.108
102. Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, 1985 S. Lu. U.L.J. 435.
103. Schneider, supra note 19, at 1, col. 2.
104. Successful treatment of genetic diseases such as congenital heart disorders, diabetes,
hemophilia, and immune deficiency allows the bearers of defective genes to live and have
children. Motulsky, supra note 31, at 137.
105. See Critics, supra note 70, at 1, col. 3.
106. Even curbing preliminary research into genetic engineering involves potential first
and fourteenth amendment difficulties, although whatever constitutional right to
scientific research may exist certainly has limits. . . .To date, however, regulation
of genetic research in the United States has been confined largely to containment
of risks to health and safety. . . .Against this narrowly focused regulatory back-
drop, genetic research is burgeoning.
Attanasio, supra note 10, at 1340-41.
107. See Judson, supra note 19, at 12-17.
108. Attanasio, supra note 10, at 1340.
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While there may be some questions as to accuracy, the techniques appear
to be increasingly more accurate. Furthermore, the procedures for obtaining
the samples are generally safe and may someday be as noninvasive as
obtaining a blood sample. Several questions are raised in relation to this
technology.
First, should the government require prenatal testing for birth defects,
under penalty of criminal sanctions? The spector of this type of legislation
brings back images of the United States' eugenics sterilization movement of
the 1920's.0 9 Currently, federal legislation permits the use of public funds
for voluntary genetic screening and counseling programs for carriers of sickle
cell anemia, cooley's anemia, tay-sachs and other genetic diseases." 0 The
Supreme Court of the United States has found that there is a constitutionally
protected right of privacy involved in making the decision of whether to
have a child,"' but whether that includes the right to refuse genetic prenatal
testing has not been determined.
Second, upon determining that defects are present, may the government
order abortion or prenatal gene therapy once such therapy is available, under
penalty of criminal sanctions? It is clear that prenatal germ line gene therapy
may never be widely practiced because treatment of abnormalities offers
little advantage over the selection process. This viewpoint assumes the ap-
propriateness of abortion, which some parents will reject for religious or
ethical reasons. There remains the problem of whether the government may
compel a parent carrying a defective fetus to engage in medical treatment
of that fetus. This question may turn on whether the fetus is afflicted with
a fatal disease or whether the fetus is merely the carrier of defective genes.
The social goal of a treatment or abortion requirement would not only be
to prevent the defective characteristic from crippling the child, but also from
continuing in future generations. While this technology does not currently
exist, these questions should not be discounted in view of the rapid devel-
opment of this new technology.
Third, may the government restrict access to prenatal information when
that information will be used to discriminate against the fetus on the basis
of sex? This problem has already been confronted because of the availability
of existing methods to identify the sex of a fetus. However, authorities have
recommended against the practice of using such tests to help parents select
the sex of a child. More discussion is required as to whether there should
be governmental interference with this form of sex discrimination.
109. See Smith, supra note 102, at 438-40 (discussing rise and fall of the sterilization
movement).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 300b-1 to 300b-6 (1988). Forty three states have limited neonatal screening
laws for phenylketonuria (PKU), a single gene effect that produces severe mental retardation
in children. See Smith, supra note 102, at 441 n.47.
I 11. See infra notes 115-126 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional rights of privacy
surrounding decisions regarding procreation).
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In addition to diagnosis of the genetic makeup of a fetus, genetic testing
might be used in employment. Diagnostic tests of workers are possible to
detect, not only abnormalities, but also the potential for such abnormalities.
This raises the possibility of using the tests to rid the workplace of the
susceptible as a cheaper alternative to creating a safe working place and also
as a means of reducing insurance costs."' Currently, some states have laws
prohibiting employment discrimination based upon discovery of the sickle
cell trait, or other atypical hereditary cellular or blood traits."'
Finally, it is possible to introduce human genes into an animal or animal
genes into a human. This is referred to as a transgenic process. Two
developments leave the future containment of transgenic processes uncertain.
The first is that half-human, half-animal cells have been fused together into
one entity which has been cloned. These half-human, half-mouse hybrid
antibodies may be used to treat multiple sclerosis and colon cancer." 4 The
second is that agricultural researchers are rapidly developing techniques for
creating new transgenic animals, which may be patentable."' It is entirely
possible that, in the future, new partly human life forms could be developed
from which valuable organs or parts may be harvested. Once the technology
is in place, it would be difficult to prevent the mass production of such
entities.
III. NEw HumA REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
In the United States, infertility among couples of child-bearing years is a
serious problem. Due to long waiting periods, adoption is frequently not the
answer. As a result, infertile couples seek alternative methods to conceive
or to acquire a child. These methods range from private adoption, to artificial
insemination, to in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), to surrogacy. Regulation of
these reproductive technologies exists at four levels: (1) regulation of research
on preembryos; (2) regulation of physicians who perform the new procedures;
(3) regulation of what kind of family relationships will be allowed in par-
enting a child; and (4) regulation of any third party donor or surrogate.
This section will examine the latter three categories, while regulation of
preembryo research will be examined separately in Part IV of this Report.
But before proceeding to the actual regulations, it is necessary to examine
112. See, e.g., Murray, Warning: Screening Workers for Genetic Risk, 13 IHAruos CENTER
REP. 5 (1983); Smith, supra note 102, at 443 n.54.
113. Gully & Bird, supra note 19, at 18-19.
114. See infra note 19, part D and accompanying text.
115. So far, genetic engineers are largely limited to transferring single genes into animals.
but a transgenic animal has been created. Recently, a boar has inherited the gene that scientists
inserted into its father, and the gene has expressed itself. The research was conducted at the
Department of Agriculture research center in Beltsville, Maryland. See Schneider, supra note
19, at 1, col. 2. Also, "supermice" were developed in 1982 by injecting rat growth genes into
mouse embryos, producing mice roughly twice the normal size. Attanasio, supra note 10, at
1282 n.46
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potential federal constitutional restraints on the regulation of reproductive
technologies.
A. Constitutional Restraints on the Regulation of Reproductive
Technology
The United States Constitution constrains both federal and state regulatory
power and has been interpreted to include a "right to privacy." The right
to privacy has been articulated most frequently in cases which protect
marriage and the family relationship and has been Oescribed, in part, as an
individual's right to make important decisions regarding marriage and pro-
creation without interference from government." 6 For example, the right to
privacy has been held to include the right to marry,"7 the right to divorce," 8
the right to abort a fetus,"19 and the right to use contraception.1 0 In Skinner
v. Oklahoma,'2' the Supreme Court explained the significance of these
particular areas of privacy and the reason for singling them out for special
protection when it stated: "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race."'2 Thus, although not explicitly
116. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-601 (1977). The Court in Whalen described the
federal privacy right as consisting of two main branches: 1) the right to make certain kinds of
important decisions without governmental interference; and 2) the right to be free of govern-
mental disclosure of highly personal matters. Id.
117. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (recognizing right to marry as
an aspect of right to privacy, stating that "the decision to marry has been placed on the same
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and family
relationships."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down as violative of equal
protection a Virginia miscegenation statute and referring to marriage as a "fundamental freedom
[which has] long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."). See generally Goodman, In Sickness or in Health: The
Right to Marry and the Case of HIV Antibody Testing, 38 DBPAuL L. REv. 87, 88-95 (1988)
(discussing history of right to marry).
118. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) (upholding one-year residency
requirement to file for divorce based on state's important interests in "avoiding officious
intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount interest, and in minimizing
the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack"); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) (sustaining indigents' challenge to a Connecticut law requiring court fees and
costs averaging $60 in order to sue for divorce, and reasoning that, because unlike other
contractual arrangements, marriage could only be covenanted for or dissolved with state
approval, state could not interfere with an individual's access to these procedures).
119. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down as violative of due process
Texas statute banning abortions in the first trimester). The Roe Court stated that the fundamental
privacy right was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
120. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down Massachusetts law
making it a felony to distribute contraceptive materials, except in the case of registered physicians
and pharmacists furnishing materials to married persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (seminal case delineating reproduction privacy right; Court struck down state statute
banning sale and use of contraceptive devices).
121. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
122. Id. at 541.
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stated in the Constitution, the right of privacy clearly extends to the right
of couples to bear their own child by sexual intercourse. Privacy rights,
moreover, are "fundamental" rights. Under current constitutional doctrine,
neither the federal nor state government can regulate activities in a manner
which abridges these rights absent a compelling state interest that is effec-
tuated through the least restrictive means available.'2 Notwithstanding these
theoretical limitations, exactly what constitutes a compelling state interest
and how far the government can go in regulating reproductive technology is
unclear, as the case law deciding these issues has been meager.
One notable exception to this general dearth of constitutional precedent
is a Michigan appellate court's decision in Doe v. Kelly.124 In Kelly, parties
to a surrogacy agreement brought an action to seek a declaratory judgment
that the Michigan Adoption Code unconstitutionally infringed their federal
right to privacy because it prohibited payment in connection with adoption
and thus outlawed their surrogate contract. The plaintiffs argued that the
adoption code provision as applied prohibited them from having children,
because under the code they could not pay a surrogate to bear a child. The
court, however, reasoned that the statute did not prevent the parties, John
Doe and Mary Roe, from having a child: it simply prevented them from
using the adoption code to change the legal status of the child. 1s The right
to change the legal status of a child, moreover, was found to be a non-
fundamental right.126 Having characterized the interference in this way, the
court had no trouble in refusing to declare the statute an unconstitutional
infringement of the federal privacy right. 
2 7
B. Federal and State Regulation
1. Federal Regulation
Unless federal funds are involved, the federal government has ordinarily
not regulated reproductive technologies.12 Congress, however, clearly has
the authority to regulate surrogacy under the commerce clause. 29 Moreover,
Congress has addressed ethical issues regarding surrogacy in a report of the
Ethical Advisory Board of the United States Department of Health, Edu-
123. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (defining strict scrutiny).
124. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
125. Id. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
126. Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 3-6 (discussing federal government's power to regulate under the
commerce clause). The United States Congress has consdiered, but not adopted, measures to
regulate surrogacy. See Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, H.R. 2433, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987).
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cation and Welfare.' Thus, federal activity in this area may increase in the
near future.
2. State Regulation
As a result of the lack of federal activity in the area, most regulation of
human reproductive techniques occurs at the state level. State regulation
covers each of the three types of reproductive techniques examined in this
section of the Report, although to varying degrees.
a. Artificial insemination
The majority of laws which regulate reproductive techniques concern
artificial insemination by a sperm donor (AID). Most of these laws establish
the paternity of the infant conceived through AID. In fact, over fifty percent
of the states have laws which establish the paternity of the infant.' 3' In
fifteen of the twenty-eight states with such laws, the law provides that the
man who donates the sperm is not the father of the resulting child. Rather,
the legal parents are the biological mother and her husband, provided that
the sperm donor consented to insemination. 3 Pursuant to these provisions
courts have ordered the husband who consented to his wife's insemination
to pay child support."' Although unclear, the AID principles should also
apply to women who donate ova.
b. Surrogacy
Another area of reproductive technology that has been the source of much
state-law litigation is surrogacy. Unlike artificial insemination, however, very
little state law exists that is specifically applicable to surrogate contracts.
The one exception is the state of Michigan, which has adopted legislation
130. Protection of Human Subjects: HEW Support of Human in Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer; Report of the Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 (1979) [hereinafter
Human Subjects).
131. See 46 FERTmrrY & STmwarry 14S n.28 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter FERTIrrY] (citing state
law provisions).
132. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(b) (Supp. 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 19-6-106(2) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 45-69j (West 1981); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 1453(b) (1987); MiNN. STAT. ANN, § 257.56(2) (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
106(2) (1983); NEV. REv. STAT. § 126.061(2) (1983); N.J. STAT. AN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp.
1985) (unless woman and donor have entered into a written contract to contrary); OR. Rnv.
STAT § 109.239()(2) (1983); Tax. F . CODE ANN. § 12.03(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.05(2) (Supp. 1985) (unless woman and donor have agreed in writing to
contrary); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1978).
133. FERTILITY, supra note 131, at IIS (citing cases).
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forbidding surrogate contracts.3 4 Moreover, AID principles, which may be
applicable by analogy to women who donate ova, will not generally apply
to surrogacy contracts. This is because most AID laws presume that the
biological mother intends to raise the child. On the other hand, in the typical
surrogacy situation, a woman is artificially inseminated with the sperm of
the man who intends to raise the child. The woman agrees before conception
to give up all legal rights to the child and to allow the wife of the biological
father to adopt the child. Thus, the situation is the reverse of the AID
situation, because the man whose sperm is used intends to raise the child,
while the biological mother does not.
Nonetheless, a multitude of more general state laws already in existence
may be applied to the surrogacy situation. Two examples of this phenomenon
are provisions found in state adoption' and custody statutes.'36 For example,
state adoption laws preventing the sale of a child might be construed to
regulate surrogacy contracts. This use of adoption code principles was ac-
cepted by a Michigan intermediate appellate court in Doe v. Kelly,'17 and
resulted in the unenforceability of a surrogate contract. 3, Antibabyselling
provisions in state adoption codes are but one example of such interpreta-
tions. In addition to statutory adoption and custody limitations, one state's
Paternity Act has also been held applicable to surrogate contracts. 39
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of using pre-existing state stat-
utory provisions to regulate surrogate contracts is the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in In re Baby M.140 The Baby M litigation grew out of a
surrogate mother's desire to avoid her contractual obligation to give up her
child to the biological father and adoptive mother. The New Jersey Supreme
134. In 1988 Michigan declared surrogacy contracts as against public policy and made
participation in a surrogacy contract, involving the payment of compensation, a felony punish-
able by up to five years imprisonment and a fine of $50,000. In the Act, a surrogacy contract
is defined as one in which a woman agrees to relinquish her parental rights upon birth. The
American Civil Liberties Union, representing three couples who wished to enter into surrogacy
arrangements, sued the Attorney General and challenged the constitutionality of the Act. Wayne
County Circuit Court, No. 88-819032-CZ (Mich. 1988). The circuit court held that the Act was
valid but only after the Attorney General agreed that he would enforce the law only if the
contract required the mother to give up the baby. It was the position of the ACLU that the
mother should have the right to change her mind if unable to relinquish the child. Both sides
hailed the decision as a victory, but the issue is once again before the Michigan legislature as
to whether the law should be more narrowly drafted. See 1988 MICH. LEotS. SERe. 199, § 5
(West).
135. Ky. Rav. STAT. As. § 199.500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
136. In determining custody, courts usually give consideration to "the best interests of the
child." See, e.g., Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984)t
137. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). See
supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing Doe in greater detail).
138. Id. at 170-72, 307 N.W.2d at 439-40.
139. Skyrowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), rev'd, 420 Mich.
367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985) (allowing use of Paternity Act in surrogate arrangement, even
where surrogate mother was married).
140. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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Court found the surrogacy contract conflicted with three statutory provisions.
First, New Jersey forbids persons from paying or accepting money in con-
nection with adoption.' 4' The court found that the parties to the surrogacy
contract, as well as the Fertility Center, violated this provision because they
used money in connection with adoption, thus, rendering the contract void. 42
Second, New Jersey only recognizes irrevocable termination of parental
rights when the child is voluntarily surrendered to an approved agency or
to the Division of Youth and Family Services accompanied by a written
acknowledgment of termination of parental rights. 43 The surrogate mother
had not surrendered the child to any such agency.1" The court reasoned
that because the state only provided for irrevocable termination of parental
rights if the child was surrendered to an approved agency, it followed that
a private placement adoption which circumvented appropriate agencies was
always revocable. The surrogacy contract, however, called for an irrevocable
surrender of parental rights. Therefore, the court concluded that the contract
conflicted with New Jersey law and was void on this ground as well. 14s
Finally, in addition to statutory conflict, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found the statute void as against public policy.1'6 The state's policy is to
keep children with both of their natural parents to the greatest extent possible.
Since the surrogacy contract at issue guaranteed permanent separation from
one of the child's natural parents, Ms. Whitehead, the contract violated the
state's policy.
However, not all states have been supportive of this use of more general
statutory provisions to ban surrogate contracts in the absence of specific
state legislative action. Perhaps the best example of this hesitancy is the trial
court decision in In re Baby M. 47 The New Jersey Superior Court, in answer
to the argument that the child born into a surrogacy arrangement will not
be protected, stated:
141. N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-54a (West 1976). The statute provides:
No person, form, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall make, offer
to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in connection
therewith (1) pay, give or agree to give any money or any valuable consideration,
or assume or discharge any financial obligation; or (2) take, receive, accept or agree
to accept any money or any valuable consideration.
142. 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
143. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-16 to-17 (West 1976); (voluntary surrender of child); id. §
9:3-41 (West Supp. 1988)(surrender must be by signed instrument); id. § 30:4C-23 (West
1976)(Bureau of Children's Services responsible).
144. 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1243. The State of New Jersey will terminate parental
rights only where there is a finding of "intentional abandonment or a very substantial neglect
of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of reversal of that conduct in the future."
N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-48(c)(1) (West 1976).
145. 109 N.J. at 423-34, 537 A.2d at 1240-46.
146. Id. at 434-44, 537 A.2d at 1247-50. The state's policy is to keep children with both of
their natural parents to the greatest extent possible. Because the surrogacy contract at issue
guaranteed permanent separation from one of the child's natural parents, Ms. Whitehead, the
contract violated the state's policy. Id.
147..Jn re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
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So long as there is no legislation and some court action in surrogacy
arrangements is required, the child born of surrogacy will be protected in
New Jersey. If there is compliance with the contract terms, adoption will
be necessary; hence, court inquiry about best interests must take place. If
there is non-compliance with the contract, as in this case, best interests is
still litigated with protection to the child, with its own guardian and experts
retained to aid the court in its best interests determination.",
The court also rejected the argument that a surrogate contract constitutes
payment to purchase a child, as the father "cannot purchase what is already
his;" consequently, it found that surrogacy did not fall within the state's
laws of adoption. 4 9 Rather, the court looked to parens patriae concepts,
which concern the best interests of the child, and contract law principles.110
These considerations led the court to reject arguments that surrogacy would
undermine traditional notions of family or exploit women of lower economic
status.' Finally, the court rejected the rule developed in Kentucky that the
mother should have a time period after birth to change her mind, stating:
To wait for birth, to plan, pray and dream of the joy it will bring and
then be told that the child will not come home, that a new set of rules
applies and to ask a court to approve such a result deeply offends the
conscience of this court. A person who has promised is entitled to rely on
the concomitant promise of the other promisor .... Once conception has
occurred the parties rights are fixed, the terms of the contract are firm
and performance will be anticipated with the joy that only a newborn can
bring."2
Another example of the hesitancy to ban surrogate contracts in the absence
of specific legislation is the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Surrogate
Parenting Association, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Armstrong.3  In
Armstrong, Kentucky's Attorney General instituted an action against Sur-
rogate Parenting Association, Inc., (Association) in order to revoke its
corporate charter. The Attorney General alleged that, by promoting surrogate
contracts, the Association had misused and abused its corporate power in a
manner which was detrimental to the state and its citizens.' 31 The Association
allegedly violated Kentucky's prohibition of the sale of children' and the
148. Id. at 371, 525 A.2d at 1157.
149. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
150. Id. at 372-73, 525 A,2d at 1157-58. The court relied on these concepts after it determined
that surrogacy was unknown and unthought of when adoption statutes were drafted. Because
adoption statutes were to be strictly construed, and surrogacy was not explicitly addressed by
the statutes, the court relied on the concept of parens patrlae and contract principles. Id.
151. Id. at 373, 525 A.2d at 1158. The court found that the "intense desire to propogate
the species is fundamental." Id. Therefore, the notion that a wealthy upper class would use a
poorer lower class to bear its children was considered "insensitive and offensive to the intense
drive to procreate naturally" which is "within the soul of all men and women regardless of
economic status." Id.
152. Id. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1157.
153. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
154. Id. at 210.
155. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
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giving up of children for adoption prior to five days after their birth.1 6
The Kentucky high court, however, refused to ban surrogate contracts
under Kentucky's antibabyselling statute. '7 The court reasoned that the
Kentucky statute was enacted to keep baby brokers from exerting pressure
on expectant mothers to give their babies up for adoption to the highest
bidder. In the surrogacy situation, these concerns were not present because
the agreement was reached before the child was conceived. In response to
arguments based on social and ethical considerations, the court added that
these should be left to the legislature. Thus, the court found no outright
ban on surrogate contracts.'
Nonetheless, even the courts which have not banned surrogacy contracts
under pre-existing state statutes have applied state law to limit their scope.
For example, the trial court in the Baby M litigation determined that it must
first decide what was in the best interests of the child, and that this interest
was paramount over the contract rights of either party.15 9 The standards set
forth in the New Jersey child custody statute were, therefore, applicable to
surrogate contracts.160 After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, the court
determined that the best interest standard dictated that the child be placed
with the father.' 61 Only then did the trial court order specific enforcement
of the surrogacy contract and terminate the surrogate mother's parental
rights. The Baby M trial court's response is typical.
The courts have not yet considered the scenario of the gestational mother
who does not wish to relinquish her nonbiologic child. In this area, however,
the use of pre-existing regulations will be much more difficult. First, the
adoption laws seem inappropriate because the biological parents would not
be adopting the child. Second, the custody statutes are similarly inapposite
because the natural parents are not opposing each other. Resolution of this
question would appear to call for a novel application of existing principles.
c. In vitro fertilization
Of the three reproductive techniques discussed in this section, in vitro
fertilization (IVF) is subject to the least regulation. Indeed, only a few states,
including Louisiana and Pennsylvania, have attempted to regulate IVF or to
prohibit the techniques.6 2 As a result of this lack of specific regulation,
courts, as in the surrogacy area, have reasoned by analogy from existing
state law to impose a degree of regulation upon the technique. Moreover,
156. Id. at § 199.601(2).
157. 704 S.W.2d at 211.
158. Id. at 214.
159. 217 N.J. Super. at 323, 525 A.2d at 1132.
160. Id. at 390-91, 525 A.2d at 1166-67.
161. Id. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1170.
162. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-133 (West Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. Am., tit. 18, § 3213(e)
(Purdon Supp. 1985). The Michigan legislature has considered such legislation. See H.B. 4554,
83d Leg. (1986).
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because IVF is a newer phenomenon than surrogacy, but related to it, the
analogies that have already been developed in surrogacy contracts are often
applied directly to the IVF technique. For example, laws prohibiting the sale
of a child for the purpose of adoption, where only the biological father
makes the contract, have been construed to regulate IVF. 16
In addition to the limitations grounded in surrogacy doctrine, the organ
transplant statutes as written in a few states may prohibit payment for eggs
or sperm. 64 Moreover, some statutes, whose enactment was triggered by
religious and moral concerns, prohibit the sale or transfer of embryos. 16
These statutes could also be construed to prohibit both payments to preem-
bryo donors and the transfer of embryos in the IVF process.
C. Emerging Social Policy Choices
Neither the courts nor the legislature has clearly enunciated a social policy
for the emerging reproductive technologies. It is clear, however, that the
argument over proper policy in this area of biomedical technology must take
into account the federal constitutional right to privacy. Under the federal
Constitution, the most protected choices lie with the couple who wish to
conceive their own biological child.' 66 When a couple is unable to conceive,
and consults with medical personnel, under current doctrine, the couple's
privacy right as joined with the doctor-patient privilege can be invoked in
order to constitutionally protect the use of noncoital techniques."67 This
application of the privacy right almost certainly would be upheld even by
conservative Supreme Court.
Furthermore, extension of this right beyond its present scope is possible,
although doubtful. If the privacy right were extended beyond the couple's
right to conceive their own biological child, the couple would then have the
fundamental right to create, store, and have transferred to them extracor-
poreal preembryos created by their egg and sperm.'" They would also have
the right to determine whether their gametes would be used for reproduction
and to determine the disposition of preembryos created with their gametes,
163. Surrogate Parenting v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986),
164. ALA. CODE § 367 [c][I] (1989); MD. HaLTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 3.5 408(a)(3) (Supp.
1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289 (1985).
165. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN4. LAws ch. 112, § 12 J(a) IV
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-342 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-735A (Supp. 1982-83); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(0
(Supp. 1982); UTa CODE ANN. § 76-7-311 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
166. See supra notes 116-127 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional right to privacy
in making decisions about procreation).
167. Such a scenario, when applied to a biological child of a couple, avoids the invocation
of adoption procedures and, accordingly, the fatal analogy drawn by the Michigan court in
Doe v. Kelly, 106 Mich. App. 160, 307 N.W.1d 438, (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983),
to a change in legal status. See supra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 116-127 and accompanying text (discussing development of right to
privacy under United States Constitution).
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which would include a right to donate preembryos to other couples. Indeed,
the right might also be found to extend to posthumous reproduction, which
might occur with stored sperm or preembryos after the death of a spouse.
The problems have been addressed by a number of prominent legal
organizations. At its February, 1989 mid-year meeting in Denver, the Amer-
ican Bar Association House of Delegates, in a vigorous exchange, approved
the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act promulgated by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 6 9 The
report, noting that in 1987 a billion dollars was spent by Americans on
infertility, 70 states: "[w]hat technology holds for the future is uncertain, but
the law must provide clear rules of legal parentage for those children born
through assisted conception.''7 The report addresses surrogacy, invitro
fertilization, artificial insemination, and all other artificial forms of procre-
ation. 7 2
IV. STATUS OF THE PREEMBRYO, AND CRYOPRESERVATION OF PREEMBRYOS
In addition to concern over the safety of new reproductive techniques and
the parentage of the newborn infant, there is much concern over treatment
of the products of procreation, especially the result of noncoital reproduc-
tion-the preembryo.'7 This section will focus on laws regulating the treat-
ment of the preembryo.
In IVF, if the sperm successfully fertilizes the egg, a "preembryo" results.
A preembryo differs from an embryo in that only the outer cells which will
form the extra-embryonic (feeding) sac are developed while the inner cells
which form the embryo are undeveloped. Additionally, an embryo is imbed-
ded in the wall of the uterus, a preembryo is not. Furthermore, the preembryo
has only a moderate chance to successfully implant in the uterus and to
come to term.
It is difficult to successfully fertilize an egg outside the human body, and
it is even more difficult for a preembryo to successfully implant and carry
itself to term. Consequently, when a couple undergoes IVF several gametes
are fertilized. Of those gametes which successfully develop into preembryos,
usually the three "best" are transferred to the woman. In some circumstances
more than three preembryos might result. The additional preembryos would
not be transferred to the woman. There is much controversy over the status
169. Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (1989) (USCACA) drafted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and approved and recommended •
for enactment in all states at the Annual Conference Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 5,
1988).
170. Id.
171. Report to the House of Delegates of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 1 (1989).
172. Id.
173. Pre-embryo is defined as "[a) fertilized ovluml not more than 14 days after fertilization."
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of the preembryo and what to do with it if it is not going to be transferred
to the woman.
If a preembryo is not going to be transferred to the woman, several
possibilities exist. First, the couple undergoing IVF might choose to donate
the preembryo to another couple. Second, the couple might choose to have
the preembryo frozen, so that they could use it at a latter date. This is
referred to as cyropreservation. Third, the couple might choose simply to
dispose of the preembryo. There are moral and legal difficulties inherent in
all of these choices.
If a couple chooses to donate the preembryo, they may have trouble
finding a capable recipient. The preembryo must be transferred to a woman
quickly and that woman must be a the appropriate stage in her menstrual
cycle to receive the preembryo.
If a couple chooses to freeze the preembryo, ownership, as well as moral,
dilemmas arise. First, if the couple divorces or one partner dies, who gets
custody of the preembryo? Who has the power to say at what point the
preembryo should be destroyed? Second, it is unclear whether frozen preem-
bryos can successfully be defrosted, implanted in a woman, and come to
term. 14 Finally, what is the preembryo? Is it human? What rights does it
have?
Similar issues arise if the couple decides to dispose of the preembryo. The
rights in this area are analogous to abortion rights. Moreover, if a couple
wants to dispose of a preembryo, should a research institution be able to
use the preembryo for research? This is currently the dispute in a lawsuit in
Maryville, Tennessee. Another dispute in the Federal District Court in Nor-
folk, Virginia involves a lawsuit seeking the release from a medical institution
of frozen embryos to the parents.'7 If so, how does this affect a woman
who chooses an abortion? Should researchers also be able to take the fetus
for use in research? As in the last section, this section of the Report will
examine the potential constitutional restraints on regulation of the treatment
of preembryos, as well as the current regulation and status of preembryos.
A. Constitutional Restraints on the Regulation of Preembryos
As was the case with the regulations examined in Part III, treatment of
the preembryo also potentially implicates the federal Constitution. In con-
cluding that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, the
Supreme Court has held, that "the unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense," and that "conception is a 'process'
over time, rather than an event."' 7 6 Applying these principles, it would
appear that, in the IVF procedure, the couple whose genetic material was
involved might have a constitutionally protected right to. destroy any re-
174. See FERTE.rrY, supra note 131, at 53S-54S.
175. See Curriden, Frozen Embryos The New Frontier, 1989 A.B.A. J. 68 (August).
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147 (1973).
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maining fertilized ova which are not implanted into a woman." 7 In connection
with this view, the Ethics Advisory Board unanimously agreed in 1979 that
although a preembryo is entitled to profound respect, it is not entitled to
the full legal and moral rights attributed to persons.'17
Nonetheless, a counterargument remains that Roe v. Wade was concerned
solely with the right of a mother to carry a child and grounded in a woman's
privacy rights in her own body. A preembryo, on the other hand, is conceived
in a petri dish; the mother is not "carrying" it as she is an embryo. Under
this interpretation, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe might not protect
the decision to destroy a preembryo. Indeed, under this rationale, the right
of the mother to destroy an extracorporeal embryo might not be constitu-
tionally protected at all. A further result of this narrow reading of Roe
would be that, because cryopreservation is still considered experimental,
physicians could constitutionally be required to transfer all fertilized ova to
the woman undergoing IVF. Requiring such a procedure, however, is dan-
gerous and could inhibit the successful birth of a child through IVF.
B. Federal Regulation
Beginning in 1973, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare began to formulate a policy with respect to the protection of
human subjects of research activities. 7 9 The final regulations, in 1975,
concluded that the government would not fund any IVF, embryonic or fetal
research until the Ethical Advisory Board (Board) reviewed the proposal and
declared the procedure ethical.'80 The Board, however, ceased to exist in
1980, without ever having reached any conclusions and, accordingly, the
department has never funded any such research. In the Health Research
Extension Act of 1985, a Biomedical Ethics Board (BEB) and a Biomedical
Ethics Advisory Committee (BEAC) were created with one charge-to report
on fetal research. No report ensued, but Congress has reauthorized the BEB
and BEAC in the Omnibus Health Extension Act of 1988.''
Even if the federal government allocated funds for such research, federal
regulations require that an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approve all
research involving humans.1e 2 These IRBs must consider whether the research
177. When they choose to destroy remaining fertilized ova, a couple could rely on their
constitutionally protected right of privacy in making decisions regarding procreation. See supra
notes 116-127 and accompanying text (discussing right to privacy).
178. Human Subjects, supra note 130, at 35,056.
179. Dep't of HEW, Protection of Human Subjects, Policies and Procedures, 39 Fed. Reg.
30,648 (1974). Informed consent was the critical concern, particularly where a subject's capability
of providing informed consent is absent or limited.
180. Dep't. of HEW, Rules and Regulations, Protection of Human Subjects, Fetuses, Preg-
nant Women, In Vitro Fertilization, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,529 (1975) (hereinafter Human
Subjects Rules].
181. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The moratorium or federally funded research
thus continues until October 31, 1990 or until the BEAC has reported.
182. As stated in Fanta, Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer
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will be conducted in a manner that will minimize risks, whether the risks
are reasonable in comparison to the anticipated benefits, and whether par-
ticipants have been sufficiently informed to consent to the research. Addi-
tionally, the IRBs monitor data to insure the safety and privacy of the
human subjects. Although no research on noncoital reproduction is currently
being federally funded, most university medical centers receive other federal
funds for research on humans, which requires IRB approval. Thus, most
hospitals which practice IVF already have IRBs even without federal funding
of IVF. While private IVF centers generally do not have IRBs, they may
have advisory committees.' Additionally, some states require that IRBs be
established. "14
C. State Regulation
As seen in Part III of this Report, the United States Constitution and
case law protects the right of the woman to obtain an abortion, at least
during the first two trimesters, prior to viability."' However, increasingly,
embryos have gained protection in state statutes.
At early common law, a conviction for murder of a fetus could only be
obtained if the fetus was born alive and subsequently died.'" One reaction
to this common law limitation has been to criminalize the destruction of a
in the United States, 2 J. OF IN Vrrao FERTLIZATION AND EMBRYO TRkNSFER 65, 67 (1985):
The regulations established the following criteria for IRB approval: (i) that the risks
to subjects be minimized; (ii) that the risks to subjects be reasonable in relation to
the anticipated benefits (but the IRBs were directed not to consider 'possible long
range effects of applying knowledge gained in the research, for example, the possible
effects of the research on public policy'); (iii) that the selection of subjects be
equitable; (iv) that informed consent be sought from each prospective subject (the
regulations established extremely detailed requirements for the method of procuring
informed consent and the elements thereof); (v) that informed consent be appro-
priately documented (again, extremely detailed requirements were established); and
(vi) that adequate provisions be made for (a) monitoring the data collected, (b)
protecting the privacy of the subjects, and (c) maintaining the confidentiality of
data.
Id. at 67.
183. However, it should be noted that the AID procedures, including surrogate mother
arrangements, are usually carried out in a doctor's office, without any official scrutiny or
screening of surrogate mothers. Many of the problems which result may be the result of an
inadequately informed consent procedure in these private situations.
184. See FERTrirry, supra note 131, at 9S.
185. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 146-156 and accompanying text for
an analysis of the federal privacy right.
186. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 627, 470 P.2d
617, 621, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 485 (1970) (husband beat wife after stating, "I'm going to stomp
it out of you"; no liability under murder statute). Accord People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402
N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
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fetus. 187 In Florida, for instance, it is manslaughter to willfully destroy a
fetus. 8 Fetus is defined as an "unborn quick child."'8 9 But such laws would
not apply to an extracorporeal embryo, because it is not "quick."
Louisiana, however, directly protects the preembryo. That state's statute
considers "an in vitro fertilized human ovum... as a juridical person until
such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb .... ",9o
The statute creates a "high duty of care"' 9' for the donors, and the physician
is directly responsible for the safekeeping of the fertilized ovum.'9 Anyone
who intentionally terminates an in vitro preembryo can be charged with
homicide.
Similar to the Louisiana statute, an Illinois statute refers to the preembryo
as a human being and entrusts the physician who performs IVF with the
care and custody of the "child."' 91 Furthermore, Illinois has a child abuse
statute which makes it unlawful to permit a child to be endangered.' 94 Thus,
a physician may be guilty of child abuse if he destroys a preembryo. However,
in response to a lawsuit involving this issue, the Illinois legislature amended
the child abuse statute to except in vitro fertilization.' 9' Notwithstanding this
limitation with respect to in vitro fertilization, one commentator has noted
that the statute could still be used to prosecute physicians or patients "who
engage in embryo lavage'1 or cryopreservation. '"' 97
Another approach to regulation is that taken by Pennsylvania. Pennsyl-
vania monitors IVF by requiring that quarterly reports be filed on any IVF
187. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1105 (Harrison 1983);
MICH. Comp. LAWS § 750.322 (1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.210 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 713-714 (West 1983). For further discussion of
criminal statutes which include the fetus, see Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32
Loy. L. REv. 357, 376 (1986).
188. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1976).
189. "The willful killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child
which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed man-
slaughter." Id.
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West Supp. 1988).
191. Id. § 9:127.
192. Id. Further, the statute provides: "(A] viable in virto fertilized ovum is a juridical
person which shall not be intentionally destroyed .... ." Id. § 9:129. As this author reads the
statute, it could be interpreted to create a criminal case for homicide ("destruction" of a
"juridical person"), though on its face, the statute is not clear.
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
194. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2354 (1987).
195. Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding Illinois' in vitro fertili-
zation statute did not absolutely prohibit in vitro fertilization).
196. Embryo lavage is an experimental procedure in which an ovum is fertilized in the
mother's uterus, then washed out for transfer to the uterus of a surrogate who carries the
embryo to term. This technique holds promise for women who can conceive but who cannot
carry a child to term; the technique could allow them to have a child of their own.
197. Andrews, supra note 187, at 399.
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procedure. The reports must include the number of fertilized ova,' 91 the
number of embryos destroyed, and the number of women in whom embryos
are implanted.'" A fine of $50.00 per day for noncompliance is mandated.M
In a related area, many states have reacted to the federal abortion right
by passing laws which ban embryo research with aborted fetuses. 201 The
statutes carry criminal penalties.= At least six states specifically prohibit
research on embryos," 3 another six prohibit research on any product of
conception,2 and six more states prohibit research on living preembryos
198. Superovulation may create as many as 17 eggs per laparoscopy, and if all fertilized, the
record keeping may become burdensome, a point to be kept in mind in determining the
constitutionality of such procedures. See Andrews, supra note 187, at 400.
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983).
200. Id.
201. Aaiz. REv. STAT ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802 (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6),(7) (West 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1986); ME. Ray. STAT. Am. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 125 (Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685-.2692
(West 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108 (3)(1987);
Nan. REv. STAT § 28-342, -346 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); Oino Ray.
CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1982); OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
202. Amz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 36-2303 (1987)(violator guilty of class 5 felony); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 390.001(10) (West 1986) (violator guilty of class A misdemeanor); LA. Ray. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:87.2 (West 1986) (person committing crime of human experimentation imprisoned at hard
labor for not less than five nor more than 20 years, or fined not more than ten thousand
dollars, or both); ME. REV. STAT. AN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980) (punishable by a fine of not
more than S5,000 and by imprisonment for not more than 5 years); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112,
§ 12J(a) V (Law. Co-op. 1985) (punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more
than two and one-half years in jail or house of correction, imprisonment for not more than
five years in state prison and fine of up to $10,000); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2691
(West 1980) (imprisonment for not more than five years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.075 (Vernon
1983) (violator guilty of class A misdemeanor); § 50-20-108 (4) (1987) (violator guilty of a
felony); NEB. RaV. STAT. § 28-344 (1979) (violation is class II misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.2-02 (1981) (violation is class C felony); Oino Ray. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (guilty of
abortion trafficking, a first degree misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon
1983) (commits first degree misdemeanor); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-2 (Supp. 1985) (guilty of
felony and fined at least S1,000, or imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 14
years).
203. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (Supp. 1982-83); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12(a)IV
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 1980); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.02 (1981); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-54-1(f) (Supp. 1982).
204. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1975), § 311.720(5),(6) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:878.2 (West 1974), § 40:1299.35.1(2), to .35.13
(West Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)IV, K (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 188.037, 188.015(5) (Vernon 1983); QiCLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§1-735, §§ 1-
730(2) (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3216, 3203 (1983).
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that are not the products of abortion. 05 Eighteen states prohibit embryo
research, but they specifically limit this prohibition to abortion procedures.2°0
These statutes, therefore, are not relevant to cryopreservation or IVF where
no abortion has occurred. Nonetheless, one commentator has noted:
"[E]mbryo transfer after in vitro fertilization might be banned since the
definition of abortion is broad enough to encompass the flushing technique
used in uterine lavage." 2w Thus, it appears possible that these statutes may
be interpreted to extend to experimentation on preembryos which result from
noncoital reproduction.2
In addition, half of the states have fetal research laws which prohibit
nontherapeutic research with fetuses and embryos. These statutes also apply
to IVF preembryos which are not implanted.2°9 The language and range of
the statutes varies. 210 Those experimental reproductive techniques which risk
loss of embryos, such as cryopreservation or embryo donation, or which
involve use of less than all of the fertilized ovum might be prohibited under
such laws.21' At best, they create an area of uncertainty for medical personnel.
Other statutes prohibit the donation of fetuses for research or experimen-
tation.212 Seven states with this prohibition potentially prohibit a woman who
conceives a preembryo from donating it,213 and five of these might prohibit
a woman from having some of her preembryos frozen for use by a second
woman.23' State statutes regarding ownership and disposition of unused
embryos and gametes have also been considered. 21 For example, one Illinois
statute, since repealed, allowed a woman to terminate an extracorporeal
embryo.216
205. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); MiOH. Comp. LAWS §§ 333.2685-333.2692 (West 1980); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-02.01, 14.02-02 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-310 (1978).
206. See supra note 201 (listing states).
207. Andrews, supra note 187, at 397.
208. Id. at 397 n.228.
209. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Law,
Co-op. 1985); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 to .2692 (West 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-02.2-01, 2-02 (1981);, R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
310 (1978).
210. See supra note 209 (sampling of statutes).
211. Andrews, supra note 187, at 397.
212. See FERTLrrY, supra note 131, at 9S.
213. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)IV
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); Micu. ComI'. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980); NEn. REv. STAT.
§ 28-342 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-2(0 (Supp.
1982); WYO. STAT, § 35-6-115 (1977).
214. ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)IV
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); MIcH. Comop. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.2-02 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-2 (f) (Supp.1982).
215. ANDREWS, supra note 187 at 403.
216. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-6(7) (1987).
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Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center"7 exemplifies the con-
fusion and emotional underpinnings surrounding the status of the preembryo.
In 1973, a physician at Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital incubated a test tube
preembryo without prior authorization. The Chief of Obstetrics and Gyne-
cology removed the tube from incubation, thus, destroying the preembryo.
He stated that the basis for the destruction was that the procedure was
unethical and immoral and needed the prior approval of the hospital's human
experimentation committee. The plaintiffs argued that through the destruc-
tion of the preembryo the doctor had intentionally inflicted emotional distress
on the plaintiff and had wrongfully converted someone else's property. The
jury awarded damages for emotional distress, but rejected the conversion
claim.238
D. Social Policy Choices
The ethical and policy issues generated by new reproductive techniques
have been addressed by various ethical, medical, and governmental groups.
In 1979, the Ethics Advisory Board reported that it is ethically acceptable
to research IVF and embryo transfer, 2 9 provided certain conditions are
met.220 The report advocated a model or uniform law to clarify the rights
and responsibilities of donors and recipients of offspring resulting from
IVF.2
2 1
Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of social policy has come from
the American Fertility Society Committee. In a report, the Committee stated
the preembryo was not a person but should be treated with profound respect.
Furthermore, if implantation is possible, the preembryo deserves more re-
spect, because it is a potential person. Moreover, research on a preembryo
which can survive embryo transfer requires an obligation not to harm the
potential offspring. 2 However, the question of whether all preembryos must
217. No. 74-3558 slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
218. Id. See Sweeny & Goldsmith, Test Tube Babies: Medical and Legal Considertions, 2 J.
o LE AL MED. 9 (1980).
219. Human Subjects, supra note 130, at 35,057.
220. These conditions consisted of (a) "that the research compi[y] with ... regulations governing
research with human subjects," i.e., the regulations respecting risk and informed consent; (b) that
[tihe research (be] designed primarily to establish the safety and efficacy of embryo transfer and
to obtain important scientific information toward that end not reasonably attainable by any other
means; (c) that the "gametes used be obtained exclusively from persons who have been informed"
of their proposed use and who "have specifically consented to such use"; (d) that "[no embryos
will be sustained in vitro beyond the stage normally associated with the completion of implantation
(14 days after fertilization)"; (e) "[alll interested parties and the generad public will be advised if
evidence begins to show that the procedure entails risks of abnormal offspring higher than those
associated with natural human reproduction" and (f) that embryo transfer "be attempted only with
gametes obtained from lawfully married couples." Fanta, supra note 182, at 67.
221. Human Subjects, supra note 130, at 33,058.
222. [Wle find a widespread consensus that the preembryo is not a person but is to
be treated with special respect because it is a genetically unique, living human entity
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be transferred to a uterus and whether research can be done with nontrans-
ferred preembryos is less clear.m
With respect to cryopreservation of preembryos, the Committee reviewed
the advantages for screening preembryos for disease or deformities and
preserving them for later use, or donating them to other infertile couples;
against the risk of preembryo injury and extension of the normal reproductive
span. The Committee concluded that research on cryopreservation should
be pursued, but carefully monitored.24 Nonetheless, the Committee further
concluded that cryopreservation should not be used as a clinical technique;
rather, it should continue to be viewed as strictly experimental.25
With respect to preembryo research, the Committee concluded that re-
search on human gametes prior to fertilization is of less concern than research
on fertilized gametes.?26 Fertilized gametes, on the other hand, should not
even be maintained beyond the fourteenth day of postfertilization develop-
ment.2 7 Although this time limitation is somewhat arbitrary, it recognizes,
that beyond this time, the definitive embryo and placenta may be structurally
discriminated, individuality seems assured, and anatomic differentiation of
the embryonic corpus begins. Moreover, because of the high moral value
accorded to each human preembryo, any requests to do research on human
preembryos requires strong justification. Indeed, the matter is of such grave
public importance that approval of preembryo research should require con-
formity with guidelines established at the national level.
that might become a person. In cases in which transfer to a uterus is possible,
special respect is necessary to protect the welfare of potential offspring. In that
case, the preembryo deserves respect because it might come into existence as a
person. This viewpoint imposes the traditional duty of reasonable prenatal care
when actions risk harm to prospective offspring. Research on or intervention with
a preembryo, followed by transfer, thus creates obligations not to hurt or injure
the offspring who might be born after transfer.
FERTIITY, supra note 131, at 30S.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 55S.
225. The Committee therefore believes that research using cryopreservation techniques
should be pursued, with careful oversight, in those centers that perform this type
of research. It appears at present that a general clinical application of freezing
human preembryos is inappropriate. The use of human preembryo material for
cryopreservation therefore should be viewed as a clinical experiment until such time
as the success rate and preembryo risks are clearly defined.
Id. at 55S.
226. The Committee finds that in research with the use of human preembryos, the
following guidelines should apply. Gametes, before fertilization are of lesser concern
than their postfertilization products. Accordingly, unfertilized eggs are not accorded
comparable worth to human preembryos at any postfertilization stage; this view
recognizes that some preembryos can progress to the development of children.
Id. at 57S.
227. Several committees have reached this conclusion, including the Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society in 1984, Great Britain's Warnock Committee also in 1984, and
Australia's Waller Commission in 1983.
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CONCLUSION
It is generally agreed that the public needs more information about the
process, limitations, and effects of the new biomedical technology, and that
the present federal structure has allowed for this only in a limited way.2
The congressional technology office published a survey of 1,273 adults in
May, 1987, and found that a majority of those interviewed believed that the
potential benefits of genetic engineering outweighed its risks, although they
were disturbed by manipulations in human embryos among other things. As
one commentator has succinctly stated: "The challenge facing the law is to
develop mechanisms that will provide adequate protection for the public
from unreasonably dangerous advances in biotechnology without fettering
progress."" 9
228. Cowen, In the Rear and Limping a Little: Some Reflections on Medicine, Biotechnology
and the Law: The Roscoe Pound Lectures, 64 NEn. L. Rav. 548, 555 (1985).
229. Permut, Biotechnology Law: Public Protection or Stifled Progress, 1986 Del. Law. 26
(Summer).
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